Gender Equity in Theories of Fertility Transition PETER MCDONALD
THE 1994 INTERNATIONAL Conference on Population and Development placed issues of gender at the center of discussion of population and development (United Nations 1995). A leading theme of the conference was that, in less developed countries, higher levels of gender equity are a necessary component in the achievement of lower fertility. In apparent contradiction to this tenet, I have postulated that very low fertility in advanced countries today is the outcome of a conflict or inconsistency between high levels of gender equity in individual-oriented social institutions and sustained gender inequity in family-oriented social institutions (McDonald 2000a). The implication is that higher levels of gender equity in family-oriented social institutions are necessary to avoid very low fertility. Thus, on the one hand, a higher level of gender equity in social institutions is claimed to lead to lower fertility while, on the other hand, a reorientation of social institutions toward a higher level of gender equity is claimed to prevent very low fertility. Chesnais (1996: 733; 1998: 83) has described this circumstance variously as "the essence of a future feminist paradox" and, more recently, as "the present feminist paradox." In what follows I address this apparent contradiction or paradox through consideration of a more generalized theory of gender equity in fertility transition.
What is gender equity?
Mason has employed the concept of the gender system, which she defines as "the socially constructed expectations for male and female behaviour that are found (in variable form) in every known human society. A gender system's expectations prescribe a division of labour and responsibilities between women and men and grant different rights and obligations to them" (Mason 1997: 158 Indeed, it is almost inconceivable that fertility transition can be studied without considering socially constructed expectations for female behavior. Mason (1997: 159) subdivides the gender system into gender stratification ("institutionalized inequality between male and female members of society") and gender roles (the division of labor between men and women). Gender equity derives from both of these elements of the gender system. Inequality between men and women and the division of labor between them in a particular gender system can be evaluated from the perspective of rights-social, political, and reproductive. Levels of equity in such an evaluation of rights determine the level of gender equity (Fraser 1994 ). Thus, gender equity is a value-laden concept that begs the question of whose values should be applied.
In consideration of fertility transition, the obvious answer is that the values of the women and men who are making fertility decisions are important. Do women (or, at least, some significantly sizable proportion of women) in a particular society consider that existing gender inequality or the existing division of labor is unfair and inequitable? Do the views of men and women coincide? Of course, women and men are unlikely to express themselves in the rarefied language of sociology. Even in the United States, Betty Friedan (1963) could refer to gender inequity only as The Problem That Has No Name. In high-fertility contexts, gender inequity within the family may be experienced by women as, inter alia, a generalized dissatisfaction with the rigors and dangers of a constant round of childbearing and childrearing imposed by spousal, familial, and societal expectations.
The use of the word system to describe gender stratification and gender roles may be misleading in that it implies consistency between different social institutions as conceptualized in the classic structural-functional anthropological approach. Essential to my argument is the notion that, in societies undergoing fertility transition, gender stratification and gender roles in different social institutions within a given society can become inconsistent with each other.
Studies of gender and fertility Mason (1997: 163-172 ) provides a review of the methodologies that would be required in studies of fertility and the gender system and reports upon the few studies that approximate her standards of evidence. As she points out, the complexity involved in proper studies of the gender system and fertility is challenging. Indeed, it may be argued that despite the logical importance of the gender system to fertility, its lack of centrality in transition theory (until recently) results in no small measure from the poor design of quantitative analyses. To test the relationship between gender equity and fertility, demographers conventionally have studied a sample of women in 428 PETER MCDONALD which there were measures of each woman's "status" and a measure of her fertility. Typically, a multivariate, cross-sectional analysis is then applied to examine whether a statistically significant relationship exists between women's status and fertility at the individual level. A more sophisticated analysis may add community-level measures of the status of women to the model. This approach could be described as based on a unidirectional, dichotomous model. As commonly hypothesized, low women's status leads to high fertility; high women's status leads to low fertility. With regard to the fertility transition, this is just one example of several unidirectional, dichotomous models that have been employed in the literature. Some other hypotheses tested by such models are: high education leads to low fertility; higher economic status leads to lower fertility; higher levels of social inclusion lead to lower fertility; lower infant and child mortality leads to lower fertility; higher costs of children lead to lower fertility; lower fertility accompanies lower religiosity; lower fertility is associated with a transition from extended to nuclear families; urbanization leads to lower fertility; and a lower point on the low fertility-ideation scale leads to lower fertility. One also finds "testing" of the tautology that, other things equal, higher or better use of birth control leads to lower fertility.
In general, the logic of unidirectional, dichotomous models has been criticized because they imply a simple, evolutionary process of social change, universal across all societies, in which progression along the path of the model is always toward a state assessed as superior to the status quo ante (Derrida 1976; McDonald 1994 ). These models have been criticized for not situating fertility within its cultural and institutional context (McNicoll 1980; Greenhalgh 1995). The unidirectional, dichotomous model is applied irrespective of, or is only superficially modified by, the social context. ' Quantitative studies of the relationship between gender equity and fertility require measures of gender equity. As defined here, gender equity would be evaluated for each social institution on the basis of the assessments of women and, perhaps, men in the society under study. This definition has inherent difficulties with respect to historical studies. In such studies, we would need to rely upon diaries, letters, and published statements of women. On the other hand, much historical research uses these types of sources. An excellent example of such an historical study that provides conclusions supporting the arguments advanced here is Catherine Scholten's (1985) study of childbearing in American society.2 If gender inequity in contemporary societies is a problem that has no name, it is difficult to obtain measures of the perceptions of gender equity from individual women. Depending upon the social context, social-psychological scales may be useful. Inevitably, however, the degree of gender equity will be measured by the researcher's own assessment of the levels of equity applying in different social institutions, based upon quantitative measures of those institutions. Such measurement will require a sophisticated anthropological knowledge The study found that few generalizations could be made across districts of Europe as to the conditions that were contemporaneous with this 10 percent fall. Given the extent of institutional variation across cultures at the onset of decline, it is not surprising that generalization proved difficult. If consideration is extended to a much larger range of world cultures, this lack of generalization is even more likely to be found. I argue here that the emphasis on the period surrounding the onset of decline may be misplaced. More value may be obtained from studying why fertility continues to decline to low levels after it has commenced to fall. In other words, the scope for theoretical generalization is probably greater in study of the sustained fall of fertility than in study of the commencement of fertility decline. The influence of changes in the level of gender equity may be more evident in this later phase.
Some propositions regarding the relationship between gender equity and fertility
The place of gender equity in fertility transition theory can be approached by considering the following two propositions:
1. Fertility in a society falls as a result of the cumulative actions of individual women and men to prevent births.3 2. Sustained lower fertility in any society will lead to fundamental changes in the nature of women's lives.
The first proposition underlies most theories of fertility transition. The implication is that fertility change in a society must be capable of being explained in individual terms. The dimension I highlight here, gender equity, is not an individual characteristic. It is a characteristic of the institutions of society. The first proposition, a truism, says that people, not institutions, change fertility levels. Thus, in proposing a place in fertility transition theory for gender equity, a theory must elaborate upon how the levels of gender equity in social institutions manifest themselves in individual-level decisionmaking. Folbre (1997) has argued that in contemporary market-based economies, the rewards for market production far exceed the rewards for social reproduction, a theme that I have also taken up specifically in relation to low fertility (McDonald 2000b). It is this imbalance in the reward structure that brings gender inequities in social institutions into the consciousness of individual men and women.
The first proposition also implies that individuals have the knowledge and the social permission necessary to control their births. As I hinted earlier, the notion that the spread of the practice of birth control is a component of fertility transition is tautological. The way in which the idea of birth control is spread, however, is a highly relevant consideration (Watkins 1986 ).
The second proposition states that if fertility in a society falls from high to low levels then, inevitably, this will change the nature of the society. In particular, it will change the nature of women's lives. Implicit in the gender system of a high-fertility society is that women devote a great deal of their time and energy to childbearing and childrearing. If fertility falls to lower and lower levels, this in itself is an indication that society no longer places the same emphasis upon this division of labor. The decision to have a child (or to avoid having a child) is not independent of the effects upon lives that ensue from that decision. That is, women have a birth or avoid a birth in an effort to shape their futures, not because the decision was preordained by a set of characteristics that they had accumulated prior to the decision (McDonald 1996) . This provides a much more active conception of the role of gender equity in fertility transition. Women in high-fertility societies may choose to have fewer children in the expectation (or vague hope) that to do so will change their futures for the better.4
The expectation, of course, may not be realized and this complicates the quantitative study of the issue. A smaller number of children might not mean that a family is economically better off or that a woman is able to pursue paid employment outside the family circle. At an early point in the transition, the statistical evidence may be weak. However, as long as women are able to maintain the expectation that restriction of their fertility will lead to an improvement in their lives, eventually, through successive age cohorts, the expectation will be more often realized. 3. In pretransition societies, high fertility was (is) socially determined, not naturally determined.
4. The transition from high fertility to fertility around replacement level is accompanied by an increase in gender equity within the institution of the family.
There is a large literature on the social supports to high fertility. Typically, social-structural arguments are offered to demonstrate the benefits of high fertility. These principally pertain to the value of children to the family, whatever its structure. (Some studies, of course, also highlight the fact that a degree of control over fertility was exercised in all pretransition societies, that is, the valued number of children was high but below the biological potential.) However, the supports for high fertility in pretransition societies are more than social-structural. High fertility becomes a part of the established family ethos and is supported by the institutions of morality, principally religion.
To argue the point just made would require a long detour; just one evocative example should suffice here: "A mother with a train of children after her is one of the most admirable and lovely Sights in the visible Creation of God," declared Benjamin Colman as he introduced the text of his sermon "Fruitful Mothers in Israel" to his Boston congregation. In 1715 the Old Testament injunction "Be fruitful and multiply," which Colman proceeded to discuss, was familiar to his listeners, and his interpretation of the text was representative of American thought on the purpose of marriage and on women's ordained part as childbearer. (Scholten 1985: 8) 
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Fertility transition requires changes not only to the social-structural supports but also to the moral supports. Here, we would be looking for changes in the morality governing the nature both of the relationship between spouses and of women's ordained role as childrearer. In the West, the assertion of the rights of the individual originating in the Enlightenment may have gradually filtered down to the rights of women within marriage. In the past half-century in developing countries, Westernization has been an increasingly powerful force with which traditional moralities have had to contend. For example, formal education inculcates ideas that empower the individual, allowing for a questioning of traditional morality.
In Western Europe, the decline of parentally arranged marriages and the shift of power over the means of production from the parental generation to the generation of the young couple are indicators of changing rights for women within a modified family organization. These changes extend back into the eighteenth century, predating or contemporaneous with the onset of fertility decline. Seccombe Once social permission to practice family planning was provided by the religious leadership in the late 1980s, the country's highly developed public health system was able to provide family planning services to both men and women. More particularly, women were freely able to gain access to these services, providing them with a greater level of reproductive rights and, hence, of gender equity within the family. Depending upon the cultural or economic setting, various factors may enhance gender equity within the family and hasten the adoption of lower levels of fertility. Where limited fertility control has been practiced before the onset of sustained fertility decline, decline may proceed more rapidly because the idea and practice of control is already present in the society. Advances in education for women will attune them to be receptive to nontraditional learning and provide them with the confidence to adopt new ideas. Husbands also may more often defer to the wishes of the educated wife. As more children survive, measures to limit family size may be implemented. Changing cost structures such as generated by compulsory education of children or urban residence may induce changes in fertility. Political regimes that are more socially inclusive may provide access to contraceptive devices and the freedom to use them to a wider range of people. The free movement of information among women in a society and between societies is another factor. The medical profession may become increasingly involved in natal care and warn of the dangers to a woman of having another birth. Advances in contraceptive technology enhance the ease of control over fertility. Finally, government-sponsored family planning programs may provide social permission and access to contraceptive services. I make no claim here that increased gender equity within families is a sufficient condition for fertility transition; however, it is a necessary condition.
Government-sponsored family planning programs in the past 30 years have succeeded in part because they addressed their campaigns directly to women, although always within their family context. Conservatism surrounding family organization clearly provided no other option, but the effect has been to raise the levels of gender equity within the family. It has been argued that, in Bangladesh for example, the family planning program itself has been an agent in improving the status of women within the family. The program exposes women to the modern outside world, it encourages them to take their own actions with regard to their fertility, it brings them in contact with other women who are not members of their family, and, since the program's change to a clinic-based delivery system, it allows women to leave their houses unaccompanied by a male family member. 434 This, together with a gradual shift in the power regime within families from the extended to the conjugal unit, has increased gender equity within the family (Simmons 1996) . In summary, there is a strong case that, where women are provided with greater decisionmaking power within the family, especially with respect to the right to determine the number of children they have, fertility can fall to low levels without major changes in women's lives outside the family. Fertility in the West fell to replacement level by the 1930s even as the male-breadwinner model of the family was rising to its zenith. That is, fertility can fall to low levels while most institutions outside the family are marked by considerable gender inequity. Folbre (1983: 276) even argues that the early advance of capitalism may have worsened gender equity in market employment while improving it within the family. Yet as proposed earlier, low fertility will change the nature of women's lives. In time, this will lead to rising demand for greater levels of equity for women in institutions outside the family. Recognition of this outcome lies at the heart of conservative, usually religious, opposition to birth control.5 In terms of the Cairo agenda, just as women in developing countries have been the beneficiaries of more advanced contraceptive technology than was available during the fertility transition in the West, they are also likely to benefit from a 
Gender equity in individual-oriented institutions
The increasing demand for individual rights and freedoms in the West in the past 200 years has led to the development of strongly individual-oriented institutions. The institutions of democracy, for example, provide individual voting rights, not family voting rights. However, the progress to this situation has passed through a period in which rights and freedoms were extended to individual men, but not to individual women. Effectively, prior to the twentieth century, men exercised the democratic rights of women. Women were educated to the level that would fit them to be suitable wives to the husbands whom they were expected to marry. Education for women was not directed toward future employment in the paid labor force. By the late nineteenth century, a woman was expected to eschew paid employment unless she was single or could not rely upon the earnings of her husband.6 Thus, individual-oriented institutions were male institutions and, as such, they promoted and protected the male-breadwinner model of the family. A relatively high level of gender equity was a characteristic of women in their family role only. Women in the West have gradually gained rights also within individualoriented institutions. The early successes were in the domains of property rights and voting rights. Rights in education grew gradually over a long period of time to the point of broad equality with men today. Rights of women in market employment have risen dramatically in the past few decades. Generally women's remuneration now tends to be guided by the principle of equal pay for equal work and, at least at the nonmanagerial level, women are now able to compete equitably with men in the labor market. Cumulatively, these changes represent radical or revolutionary change.
At the same time, progress toward gender equity within the family and hence in family-oriented institutions has continued to advance very slowly. While, as argued in the previous section, the change within the family has been sufficient to allow women to have extensive control over their fertility, it has not provided other forms of equity within the family. Full gender equity would be achieved only if gender were not a determinant of which member of the couple undertook the three forms of family work: income generation, caring and nurturing, and household maintenance. In marriages, women remain the predominant providers of care and continue to carry most of the burden of household maintenance. Gender stratifica-436 tion continues to prevail within the contemporary Western family. The same is true in the East Asian developed economies that also now experience low fertility.
Gender equity and very low fertility
In advanced economies today, women are able to compete in the labor market as equals so long as they are not constrained by their family roles. Women who value their involvement in individual-oriented institutions are therefore faced with a dilemma if they perceive a potential future family role as inconsistent with their aspirations as individuals. Some women in this circumstance will opt to eschew the family role rather than the individual role, that is, they will not form a permanent relationship or they will elect to have no children or fewer children than they otherwise would have intended (McDonald 2000a). Most young women today have been educated and socialized to expect that they will have a role as an individual beyond any family role they may have. Thus, a fifth proposition can be advanced: 5. When gender equity rises to high levels in individual-oriented institutions while remaining low in family-oriented institutions, fertility will fall to very low levels.7
Cross-national comparisons of contemporary advanced countries provide evidence to support this proposition (Chesnais 1998; McDonald 2000a).
Conclusion
The apparent contradiction stated at the beginning of this article has been addressed through distinguishing two broad forms of gender equity: gender equity in family-oriented institutions and gender equity in individual-oriented institutions. I have argued that the fertility transition from high to low levels has been associated mainly with improving gender equity within family-oriented social institutions, indeed almost exclusively within the family itself. The fall in fertility is associated with women acquiring rights within the family that enable them to reduce the number of their births to more desirable levels. However, change in the institution of the family proceeds slowly because the family system is strongly linked to conservative institutions such as religion. The link is the reification of family as defined by an idealized family morality.
During the twentieth century, a revolution took place in levels of gender equity in individual-oriented institutions in advanced countries. Starting from a point where women had a subordinate status in individual institutions such as formal education and market employment, the century ended with very high levels of gender equity prevailing in these institutions. High levels of equity enjoyed by women as individuals in combination with continuing low levels of equity for women in their roles as wives or mothers mean that many women will end up bearing fewer children than they aspired to when they were younger. The outcome for the society is a very low fertility rate. The achievement of gender equity in individual-oriented institutions will not be reversed. But in a context of persistent relatively low gender equity in family-oriented institutions, high gender equity in individual-oriented institutions results in very low fertility. The idea is conceptualized in Figure 1 . Very low fertility rates will persist unless gender equity within family-oriented institutions rises to much higher levels than prevail today. In a context of high gender equity in individual-oriented institutions, higher gender equity in family-oriented institutions will tend to raise fertility.
Notes
The author benefited from discussions about this article with Hera Cook and Rebecca Kippen.
1 On the other hand, at the opposite extreme, there is a recent fashion to attribute unexplained variation to "context," adding little or nothing to theory. 5 The papal encyclical Humanae Vitae, issued in 1968, is a prime example.
6 For some, this idea is still valid, it seems. Mead (1999) argues that in the United States today, mothers in two-parent families should not engage in paid employment while single mothers should.
7 Very low means a total fertility rate below 1.5 births per woman on average.
